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PUNISHMENT AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

Carl Tobias*
INTRODUCTION

Certain features of the war on terrorism impose novel and controversial punishment schemes. For example, President George W.
Bush has unilaterally invoked executive authority to detain thousands
suspected of terrorism over protracted times and to create military
tribunals. The government has imprisoned two American citizens,
denying them access to counsel for more than a year, and it has incarcerated 650 individuals without process at Guantanamo Bay. Bush
administration officials recently announced that they would try some
Guantanamo detainees in military commissions; however, these bodies will accord fewer protections than the civilian system or even
courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
The federal judiciary has differed about the government's power
to confine those incarcerated. A three-judge panel on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sustained one citizen's
detention and acquiesced in the President's designation of him as an
enemy combatant. However, two Second Circuit judges ruled that
the executive possessed insufficient authority for holding another
citizen so designated. A D.C. Circuit panel unanimously found the
court lacked jurisdiction over many Guantanamo detainees, yet two
Ninth Circuit panel members entertained a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which one prisoner filed. The Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari on the Second, Fourth, and D.C. Circuit opinions,
and it may well review the Ninth Circuit appeal, even though the Justices declined to hear several cases that involve the war on terrorism.
Indefinite detentions and military tribunals warrant legal, policy,
and theoretical criticism. As general matters, the practices undermine the rule of law domestically by violating fundamental tenets in
the United States Constitution and overseas by flouting established
international law precepts. The actions specifically contravene separation of powers among the federal government's tripartite branches,
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as well as infringe on essential rights of persons held and the defendants whom military commissions will try. The conduct also resembles other nations' behavior that America has vociferously criticized.
The war on terrorism, thus, has fostered the creation of disputed
punishment regimes that do not account for their impacts and that
overemphasize security vis-a-vis liberty. These ideas, especially Supreme Court willingness to address the most important litigation pitting national security against civil liberties in half a century, illustrate
that punishment and the war on terrorism merit scrutiny, which this
Article undertakes.
The first section descriptively assesses the new, contested punishment systems the Bush administration has used to fight the war on
terrorism. I then explore the benefits and costs of the measures
whose principal functional justification is national security, but determine that the techniques are not responsive to their adverse consequences. For instance, the regimes may have enhanced security yet
have undercut detainees' civil liberties and will compromise the
rights of individuals prosecuted before the military tribunals. In
short, the detriments, namely which relate to civil liberties, outweigh
the advantages, particularly the ones that implicate security. The war
on terrorism's continuation will exacerbate this ratio, as the government detains, and military commissions try, more people. The third
section, accordingly, proffers recommendations for the future. Illustrative is using federal courts or international tribunals, not military
commissions, to prosecute defendants accused of terrorism. These
options would reduce authority's concentration in the Executive
Branch, will undermine civil liberties and global relationships less,
and could protect security as much.
I. DESCRIPTIVE AsSESSMENT

The ongms and development of the unique and controversial
punishment schemes that the Bush administration has implemented
while responding to the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes deserve
limited treatment here, in part as that background has received
1
analysis elsewhere. Nonetheless, a comparatively thorough evaluation is warranted because this should increase appreciation of

1

See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002) (analyzing the different
treatment by the Bush administration of non-citizens and citizens in the wake of September 11);
Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002) (discussing the Bush administration's response to September 11 in terms of domestic and international law); Jonathan
Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian
Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649 (2002) (analyzing the Bush administration's approach to
the September 11th attacks in a historical context).
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significant phenomena. First, it will improve understanding of the
realist critique, which holds that compliance with the letter of international law would erode United States and world security interests
and, therefore, justifies suspending the requirements that traditionally apply. Second, the assessment should improve comprehension of
how detentions and military tribunals violate the rule of law at home
as well as globally.
A. Military Commissions and Federal Court jurisdiction
On November 13, 2001, President Bush promulgated an Executive Order which authorized creation of military tribunals and osten2
sibly denied federal court access to individuals tried before them.
The President and upper-echelon administration officials relied substantially on pragmatic ideas, while they asserted that many reasons
support discontinuing the strictures which typically govern criminal
responsibility's adjudication. These include federal court trials' expense, time and risks for judges and jurors, the lack of necessity to
protect terrorists' rights, the available evidence not meeting stringent
evidentiary requirements and security mandating it be kept secret,
and detentions and commissions according government necessary
control. 3 To the extent the Bush administration has invoked law, the
November order and its attempted elimination of federal court jurisdiction are based on Ex parte Quirin, the Second World War case im4
plicating the Nazi saboteurs; powers delegated by Article II in the
5
Constitution; and Congress's September 2001 Authorization for Use
6
of Military Force Joint Resolution.

2

See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,835-36 (Nov. 16, 2001)
[hereinafter Bush Order] ("With respect to any individual subject to this order-(l) military
tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by the individual; and (2) the
individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding ... [in] any
court of the United States .... "); see also DEP'TOFDEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER NO. l
(2002) [hereinafter DOD ORDER] (listing crimes that may be tried by military commissions and
establishing military comm1Ss1on jurisdiction over these crimes),
available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/ directives/ corres/mco/mcol.pdf.
' See, e.g., Cole, supra note l, at 977 ("[T]hey permit the use of classified evidence, presented ex parte and in camera, to convict suspects .... "); Dickinson, supra note l, at 1437; Ruth
Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM.J. lNT'L L. 328 (2002); see also
infra notes 7-22 and accompanying text. But see Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military
Commissions, 96 AM.J. lNT'L L. 337 (2002).
4
Ex pane Quirin, 317 U.S. l (1942) (holding military tribunals constitutional); see Bush Order, supra note 2 (citing Quirin); DOD ORDER, supra note 2 (citing Quirin).
5
U.S. CONST. art. II.
6
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). See generally LoUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW
(2003) (providing a comprehensive analysis of Quirin and the joint resolution).
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President Bush, cabinet members, and numerous other highranking public officials have variously depended on Quirin, as well as
practical concepts involving national security. For example, when the
President substantiated the Executive Order, he mentioned Quirin in
recounting how President Franklin D. Roosevelt ("FDR") had instituted a World War II commission, and President Bush described
"[n]on-US citizens who plan and/or commit mass murder" as "unlawful combatants," asserting military commissions should try them if
7
this promoted the "national-security interest." On November 14,
2001, Vice President Dick Cheney similarly alluded to Quirin and the
use of military tribunals since the founding as the entities' principal
justifications and stated they could try those responsible for the terrorist attacks, who do not "deserve the same guarantees" as American
8
citizens "going through the normal judicial process."
That day, Attorney General John D. Ashcroft offered analogous
notions by invoking the commissions' long tradition and High Court
recognition, most pertinently in Quirin, that these tribunals are legitimate. He also argued that "foreign terrorists who commit war
crimes against the United States ... are not entitled to" our constitu9
tional protections. On December 6, Ashcroft testified that Quirin
approved commission use "in the United States against enemy belligerents," and the Court exercised "habeas corpus jurisdiction to decide" on its validity and "whether the belligerents were actually eligi10
ble for trial under the commission."
The Department of Justice
("DO]") Assistant Attorneys General, who led the war on terrorism,
have relied upon Quirin. For instance, the Assistant Attorney General
for the Criminal Division, Michael Chertoff, defended the Bush

7

Wayne Washington, FDR MtJVe Cited in Tribunals, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2001, at Al; see
Mike Allen, Bush Defends Order for Military Tribunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001, at Al4 (affording the allusion). President Bush later supported tribunals by asking Americans to remember
that those who would be tried "are killers. They don't share the same values we share." President's Exchange with Reporters in Alexandria, Virginia: Military Tribunals, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 469 (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v38nol2.html;
see Jonathan Turley, Military Tribunal Rules Put Our Values to Test, BALT. SUN, Mar. 25, 2002, at
7A.
8
Vice President Richard Cheney, Address to the United States Chamber of Commerce
(Nov. 14, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/
11/20011114-6.html); see also 60 Minutes JI (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 14, 2001) (transcript available at http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp2001
1114.html). See generally Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military
Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433 (2002) (examining the legality and wisdom of the Bush administration's use of military tribunals to combat terrorism).
9
Attorney General John Ashcroft & INS Commissioner Ziglar Announce INS Restructuring
Plan (Nov. 14, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarksll_l4.htm.
0
'
Anti-Terrorism Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001)
(statement of John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, recounting the commissions' venerable
history), 2001WL1559002.
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Order by claiming that its language was "virtually identical" to that in
the Roosevelt proclamation and order, tribunals enjo{ a long history,
and the Court found them constitutional in Quirin. 1 The Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Policy, Viet Dinh, has relied
on commissions' pedigree, mentioned how FDR had convened the
bodies, and invoked Q{;irin to argue the "Court has unanimously up2
held" their legitimacy. Department of Defense ("DOD") Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld supported the Bush and DOD Orders by remarking
that tribunals have been used in wartime since the nation's origins,
Roosevelt had adopted them, and the "Supreme Court upheld" the
13
entities' validity in Quirin. The DOD General Counsel, William J.
Haynes, II, depended on Quirin to justify the March 2002 Department
Order, and he observed that the federal judiciary had affirmed executive power to employ tribunals. 14
White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales has relied on Quirin for
the notion that the Justices have "consistently upheld" military commission use, and he stated that the Bush Order's terms were derived
from those of the Roosevelt proclamation and order, words the Court
15
interpreted to allow habeas corpus scrutiny.
The White House
Counsel also urged that any "habeas corpus proceeding in a federal
court" which challenges actions under the Bush Order authorizing
trial of non-United States citizens by military tribunals would be limited to scrutinizing "the lawfulness of the commission'sjurisdiction." 16

11

See Department ofjustice Oversight: Preseroing Our Freedoms twiile Defending Against Terrorism,
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 107th Cong. 8-20 (2001) [hereinafter DO] Oversight] (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant U.S. Attorney General); see also infra notes 15-16
and accompanying text.
12
Viet D. Dinh, Foreword: Freedom and Security After September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
399, 405-06 (2002). See Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, On Terror, Spying and Guns, Ashcroft Expands Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2003, at Al. Dinh and Chertoff have since recanted. See Richard B. Schmitt, Patriot Act Author Has Concerns, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003, at Al (discussing reconsideration of the issues by Dinh and Chertoff).
" Defense Department and Military Tribunals: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Seroices,
107th Cong. (2001) (joint statement of Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, and Paul
Wolfowitz, Deputy U.S. Secretary of Defense, discussing the appropriateness of military tribunals), 2001 WL 1587683.
14
"The Fourth Circuit recently reaffirmed" these propositions in Hamdi. Letter from William Haynes, II, General Counsel, DOD, to Neal Sonnett, Chair, ABA Task Force on Enemy
Combatants (Sept. 23, 2002) (on file with author). See generally Jonathan Turley, The Military
Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. I (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court's role in developing
the military system of governance).
15
Alberto R. Gonzales, Op-Ed, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27
(supporting the use of military commissions and defending their constitutionality); see also
Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 394 n.85
(2002) (discussing Gonzales' claim that judicial review is preserved under the Bush Order).
16
Gonzales, supra note 15, at A27. Senators' views similar to the administration's are in the
hearings cited supra notes 10-11, 13.
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B. Detentions
The federal government has indefinitely detained thousands of
people it suspects are engaged in terrorism, and many officials have
justified the effort with practical contentions-mostly national and
global security concerns-and with legal arguments that resemble the
ones detailed for military tribunals. Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the officers have followed Ashcroft's directive that they use
"every available law enforcement tool" to incapacitate those "who participate in, or lend support to, terrorist activities" by arresting and
holding persons in custody over long periods through criminal
charges, material witness warrants for individuals in America legally,
17
and immigration charges for people in the United States illegally. A
specific policy of racial profiling mainly targeted at the Arab and
Muslim communities in America, as well as a veil of secrecy which
frustrates efficacious outside scrutiny, characterizes these detentions.18
The United States has indefinitely detained a few of its citizens by
labeling them enemy combatants. For example, during 2001, President Bush so certified Yaser Hamdi, who remained in naval brigs
without counsel until last December, while in June 2002, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson asserted Jose Padilla was imprisoned
"under the laws of war as an enemy combatant" and cited Quirin as
19
"clear Supreme Court" authority.

17

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DOJ, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE
TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (2003) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf. For full analysis of detentions the government premised on alleged immigration law violations and material witness warrants, see Cole,
supra note 1.
18
See Jonathan K. Stubbs, The Bottom Rung of America's Race Ladder: After The September 11 Ca·
tastmphe Are American Muslims Becoming America's New N . ... s?, 19 J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming
2004). Most courts have maintained this veil. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'! Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the government was justified in withholding
information regarding detainees under an exception in the Freedom of Information Act), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004) (mem.); N.Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d
Cir. 2002) (holding that newspapers did not have a First Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings that affected national security), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003) (mem.).
But see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that there is a First
Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings).
19
News Transcript, Deputy Secretary [of Defense] Wolfowitz at Justice Department Press
Conference (June 10, 2002) (statement by Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General),
http:/ /www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/t06102002_t0610dsd.html; see also Manooher
Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of War": The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 59 (2003); infra note 23 (showing Hamdi's three Fourth Circuit appeals and one Supreme Court appeal).
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The United States has also held approximately 650 non-citizens at
20
Guantanamo Bay. Observers have reported terrible conditions under which many have labored, the use of abusive tactics to extract
confessions or other material from some, and numerous attempted
21
suicides. Virtually all detainees have received no process, although
the government stated last July that it would try a few in military
commissions and recently granted others access to counsel. 22

C. War on Terrorism Litigation
The DOJ and the DOD depended substantially on the pragmatic
arguments related to national security and on Quirin, in part, for
broad deference to the executive during national crises when the
agencies litigated major terrorism cases which implicated detention,
and numerous judges have agreed with these views. Moreover, Quirin
figured i:>rominently in all of the Fourth Circuit Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
decisions23 and in the Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush district court ruling.24 The DOJ lodged its strongest contention when pursuing a
Hamdi appeal, stating that because judges have a "constitutionally
limited role ... in reviewing military decisions, courts may not second-guess the military's determination that an individual is an enemy
25
combatant and should be detained as such." The appellate panel
6
denigrated the argument by first recasting it2 and then rejecting the

20

See Carlotta Gall & Neil A. Lewis, Captives: Tales of De,spair from Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 2003, at Al (approximating 680 men); OIG Report, supra note 17; infra notes 38-39
and accompanying text (assessing the three major challenges to the detentions); sources cited
infra note 43.
21
See Nicholas M. Horrock & Anwar Iqbal, Waiting for Gitmo, MOTHERJONES,Jan./Feb. 2004,
at 15; Raj Persaud, Mental Anguish Likely to Be Most Damaging, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 12,
2004, at 18, available at 2004 WL 70808198; David Rose, Even Death Row Is Preferable to This,
OBSERVER (London), Feb. 22, 2004, at 17.
22
See Richard Cohen, Lawless in Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2004, at Al9; Jerry
Markon, Terror Suspect, Attorneys Meet for 1st Time, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2004, at 83.
23
This case was first brought in the Eastern District of Virginia and has received three
Fourth Circuit opinions. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Quirin several
times), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (mem.); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2002) (citing Quirin to support judicial deference to the executive branch); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002).
24
This case was brought in the Southern District of New York. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v.
Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Quirin in discussion of prisoners of war and
detention). The Second Circuit recently held that the government lacked power to detain
Padilla and ordered his release. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 715 (2d
Cir. 2003) (rejecting Quirin as establishing "President's authority to exercise military jurisdiction over American citizens"), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (mem.).
25
Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283.
26
Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283 ("The government thus submits that we may not review at all its
designation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant-that its determinations on this
score are the first and final word.").
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27

government's motion. Despite this rebuke, the Fourth Circuit essentially agreed with the government's claim. For instance, the panel
cited Quirin extensively for ideas, such as during "World War II, the
Court stated in no uncertain terms that the President's wartime detention decisions are to be accorded great deference from the
28
courts." Moreover, the Fourth Circuit effectively adopted the DOJ's
perspective because the court grounded its executive acquiescence
on Quirin, did not closely analyze the support for detaining Hamdi,
29
and refused him access to counsel. The three Hamdi decisions also
underemphasized the substantial growth in habeas corpus and international law since Quirin issued. 30
District court treatment of the Padilla matter resembled, and drew
on, that in Hamdi. 31 For example, the trial judge determined that the
"logic of Quirin bears strongly on this case" and broadly invoked the
opinion, which recognized the "distinction between ... lawful and
unlawful combatants" and declared that "[u]nlawful combatants are
likewise subject to capture and detention. "32 The court analogized
from the World War II precedent and held that President Bush had
33
authority to detain unlawful combatants. The judge also observed
that the Justices did intimate FDR's "decision to try the saboteurs before a military tribunal rested at least in part on an exercise of Presidential authority under Article II" even while acknowledging the
Court found it unnecessary to resolve whether the "President as Commander in Chief ha[d] constitutional power to create milita2:
commissions without the support of congressional legislation." 4
Moreover, the judge displayed great deference when he espoused a
27

The court elaborated: "In dismissing, we ourselves would be summarily embracing a
sweeping proposition-namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen
alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on
the government's say-so." Id.
28
Id. at 282. See generally Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (finding that the President has
authority to order trial by a military commission).
29
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that Hamdi's detention was
constitutional). Hamdi remains in custody but recently was accorded access to counsel. See
Vanessa Blum, As Pressure Mounts, U.S. Strategy Shifts: Administration Move to Allow Counsel for Detainees Comes As Supreme Court Prepares to Take up Issue, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at I.
"° See infra Part 11.A.2.b. But see Hamd~ 316 F.3d at 468-69 (rejecting application of the Geneva Convention).
31
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also supra notes
25-30 and accompanying text.
32
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30-31) (emphasis added);
see also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
" See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-96. If the Supreme Court "regarded detention alone as
a lesser consequence than ... trial by military tribunal[.] and it approved even that greater consequence, then our case is a fortiori from Quirin as regards the lawfulness of detention." Id. at
595.
"" Id.; see Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28-29 (recognizing the powers of the President as Commander
in Chief).
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quite lenient proof burden of "some evidence," which the United
States must meet to justify a presidential determination that an indi35
vidual is an unlawful combatant. The court also relied on Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer for the notion that the chief executive
was "operating at maximum authority" in the "decision to detain
Padilla as an unlawful combatant."36 However, the Second Circuit ordered Padilla's release and depended on Youngstown's analytical
framework for the critical ideas that (1) "the President lacks inherent
constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain American
citizens on American soil outside a zone of combat;" (2) "the NonDetention Act serves as an explicit congressional 'denial of authority'
within the meaning of Youngstown, thus placing us in Youngstown's
third category;" and (3) "because the Joint Resolution does not authorize the President to detain American citizens seized on American
37
soil, we remain within Youngstown's third category."
Three major cases have challenged the indefinite detentions at
Guantanamo Bay. The D.C. Circuit essentially rejected petitioners'
habeas corpus writs because none were U.S. citizens who had established their presence in America, relying heavily on the 1950 precedent of Johnson v. Eisentrager, and the court found that Guantanamo
was not United States territory, even though the country maintains a
naval facility there. 38 Yet, the Ninth Circuit held that Eisentrager did
not preclude its assertion of jurisdiction over the habeas petition or

35

See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 605-10 (discussing the deference given to the President's
determination). The court apparently premised this deference on its limited authority and
competence to decide the question and on the President's substantial authority in this context.
36
Id. at 60{H}7; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the three categories of presidential authority);
MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CAsE: THE LIMITS OF PREsIDENTIAL POWER

(1977) (assessing "the influence [of YoungslolJ!n] on the theory and practice of presidential
power and on the doctrine of separation of powers"); infra notes 90-110 and accompanying
text. The court did reject the government claim that Padilla should not have access to counsel.
See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 564, 599-605 (directing U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to allow Padilla to consult with counsel).
37
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003) (ordering a writ of
habeas corpus and Padilla's release). "[T]he third category [of Youngstown] includes those
situations where the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of
Congress." Id. at 711. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (2000) ("No citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."); Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001 ); infra notes 90-104 (describing Youngtown's analytical framework).
38
See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct. 534
(2003) (mem.); see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (finding that non-resident
aliens do not have access to courts). For more analysis of these cases, see Raquel AldanaPindell, The 9/ 11 "National Security" Cases: Three Principles Guiding judges' Decision-Making, 81 OR.
L. REV. 985, 1010 (2002) (citing the D.C. Circuit decision in Al Odah v. United States as rejecting
the argument that Guantanamo Bay is U.S. territory), and Cole, supra note 1, at 983-84 (discussing the Eisentrager holding).
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necessitate sovereignty rather than territorial jurisdiction, which
clearly existed, while the court determined that the lease, the "continuing Treaty as well as the practical reality of the U.S.'s exercise of
unrestricted dominion and control over the Base[,] compel the conclusion that, for the pur:~oses of habeas jurisdiction, Guantanamo is
9
sovereign U.S. territory." Finally, the government's prosecution of
Zacarias Moussaoui in federal court has realized little success, notwithstanding the trial judge's concerted efforts to decide the matter
40
fairly and promptly.
II. CRITICAL AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES

A. Why Reliance Is Misplaced as a Matter of Law
1. Military Commissions and Federal Court Jurisdiction
It could appear preferable to discuss briefly the administration's
misplaced reliance on Quirin when issuing the Bush and DOD Orders.41 The government has prosecuted no one in military tribunals,
and scholars have explored their legitimacy. 42 However, other ideas
43
require more assessment. Commissions will soon try defendants and
provoke litigation contesting their validity. Thorough evaluation will
also improve appreciation of Quirin's use, Youngstown as the most
relevant precedent, and why the latter opinion and the Constitution
do not allow the President to vitiate federal court jurisdiction, even
39

Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1300 (9th Cir. 2003). An earlier Ninth Circuit opinion
resolved the first challenge on procedural grounds when it found that plaintiffs lacked the
standing to proceed. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the
coalition lacked standing to bring claim), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003) (mem.).
40
See United States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4792, 2004 WL 868261, at *21 (4th Cir. Apr. 22,
2004) (affirming the district court's conclusion that Moussaoui should be granted access to exculpatory witnesses, but remanding the case to the district court to "craft substitutions under
certain guidelines."); see also John Gibeaut, Prosecuting Moussaoui, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 36 (describing the prosecution of Moussaoui); Seymour M. Hersh, The Twentieth Man, NEW YORKER,
Sept. 30, 2002, at 56 (same); Philip Shenon,Judge Rules Out a Death Penalty for 9/11 Suspect, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at Al (same).
41
See supra notes 7-22 and accompanying text; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
42
See Dickinson, supra note I; see also Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15. See generally Cole, supra
note l; Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE LJ. 1259 (2002); Youngstown at Fifty: A Symposium, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 1
(2002).
43
See DOD, MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 2 (2003), available at
http:/ /www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/ d20030430milcominstno2.pdf; Blum, supra note
29; Dan Eggen, FBI Chief Says Tribunals May Try 9/11 Suspects, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2004, at Al
(stating that the September 11 conspirators will be tried in military tribunals instead of criminal
courts); Adam Liptak, The Legal Context: Tribunals Move from Theory to Reality, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2003, at Al2 (stating that President Bush designated six Guantanamo prisoners to be tried before military commissions).
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though tribunals might be legitimate in some contexts---overseas
prosecutions that arise from declared wars.
a. VVhy Youngstown and the Constitution Are Controlling
1.

Constitutional Text and History

The Constitution's text and history as well as case law demonstrate
that Congress, not the Executive, is the federal government's political
branch authorized to create federal court jurisdiction. Article I states
"Congress shall have Power ... [ t] o constitute Tribunals inferior to
44
the supreme Court," and Article III says "The judicial Power of the.
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such in-"
ferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."45 The first Congress established the lower federal courts and
46
prescribed their jurisdiction. Article I also states Congress is to "de47
fine and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations."
More48
over, landmark cases, such as Sheldon v. Sill, held that the "disposal
of the judicial power (except in a few specified instances) belongs to
,,49
Congress.
ii. Post-September 11, 2001, Legal Developments
Despite the Constitution's text and history, President Bush issued
the November Order, which in section 7 (b) provides that the military
commissions "shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses
by" anyone subject to the Order, who "shall not be privileged to seek
any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to
have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii)
any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal."50
This expansive wording imposes the proscription on all courtsfederal, state, or international-apart from the military tribunals it
creates. 51 As to the order's critical issues, detentions and federal
44

45
46
47

U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 9.
U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1.
See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see Cole, supra note 1, at 977; Dickinson, supra note 1, at

1419.
48

49 U.S. 441, 8 How. 453 (1850).
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. at 449, 8 How. at 462; see Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 384-86
(discussing Sheldon v. Sill).
50
Bush Order, supra note 2, § 7(b).
51
I stress jurisdiction stripping and do not assess whether the Bush Order can deprive state
or international courts or tribunals of power to afford relief. The Supreme Court sharply limited state court ability to grant people in federal officers' custody relief in Tarble's Case, 80 U.S.
49
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court jurisdiction stripping, the administration initially requested
Congress's approval, which lawmakers denied, and then arrogated to
itself through the directive the power sought. On September 19,
2001, President Bush sent Congress proposed legislation, titled the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 ("ATA"), which addressed numerous law
52
enforcement, immigration, and counterterrorism matters. Sections
202 and 203 had greatest relevance for the issues that the order
would later address. Section 202 would have authorized the Attorney
General to detain indefinitely any United States non-citizen whom
that official "ha[d] reason to believe may commit, further, or facili53
tate acts" of terrorism, defined quite broadly.
Section 203 would
have granted the District of Columbia federal courts exclusive authority over federal habeas corpus review of section 202 detentions. 54 Re55
publicans and Democrats in both Houses, as well as interest groups,
56
strongly opposed these sections.
The statute Congress ultimately
passed imposed several major restrictions on the Attorney General's
detention authority." First, it modified the threshold standard from
"reason to believe" to "reasonable grounds to believe" that the

(13 Wall.) 397 (1871). See also McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. 598, 6 Wheat. 268 (1821) (denying
state courts power to issue writs of mandamus to federal officers); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 46, at 298 (6th ed. 2002) (assessing McClung v. Silliman).
52
A version of the proposed Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 can be found at Electronic Privacy
Information Center, http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/ata200l_text.pdf (last visited May
7, 2004) [hereinafter ATA]; see also Editorial, American Values on Trial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002,
at Bl6.
53
See ATA, supra note 52, § 202; see also Terrorism Investigation and Prosecution: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (including statement of Senator Specter
quoting§ 202 of the Bush administration draft legislation), 2001 WL 1132689. See generally
Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L LJ. 23, 34-36 (2002) (describing the
steps taken by the government following the September 11 attacks).
54
See ATA, supra note 52, § 203; see also Editorial, Winging It at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
23, 2002, at A22 ("[P]ublic confidence ... demands a return to ... independent court review.").
55
See Jonathan Krim, Anti-Terror Push Stirs Fears for Liberties: Rights Groups Unite To Seek Safeguards, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at Al 7 (discussing a "coalition of public interest groups
from across the political spectrum [that] has formed" in opposition to the administration's antiterrorism legislation because of its effects on "Americans' privacy and civil rights."); Walter Pincus, Caution is Urged on Terrorism Legislation: Measures Reviewed To Protect Liberties, WASH. POST,
Sept. 21, 2001, at A22 (stating that the legislation "has quickly drawn opposition from some
members of Congress, as well as a diverse collection of interest groups."); see also Editorial, No
Rush on Rights, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A34.
56
For a thorough exposition of this opposition, see Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 38891.
57
See The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]; see also Eric Lichtblau, Republicans Want Terrorism Law
Made Pennanent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003, at Bl (outlining the sunset provisions of the USA
PATRIOT Act).
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58

suspect would engage in or assist terrorist acts. Second, the Act significantly limited the officer's power to detain non-citizens suspected
of terrorism. 59 Third, the Act explicitly prescribed federal judicial review, through habeas corpus proceedings, of "any action or decision
relating to [section 412] (including judicial review of the merits of)"
60
the Attorney General's certification. These restrictions are in the
USA PATRIOT Act, which President Bush signed on October 26,
2001.

61

Although Congress denied the Attorney General the indefinite
detention power sought, the order prescribed eighteen days later
granted the Defense Secretary that authority. Section 3 empowers
and directs the Secretary to take into custody and "detain [] at an appropriate location ... outside or within the United States" any "indi62
vidual subject to" the directive. Section 2 defines such an individual
as any person "who is not a United States citizen with respect to
whom [the President] determine[s] from time to time in writing
that ... there is reason to believe that such individual" is an international terrorist dangerous to the United States or is someone who
63
"has knowingly harbored one or more" such people. The order in
fact claims much greater power than had been requested, as the most
aggressive stance in Congress was that federal habeas corpus review of
detentions should be limited to the District of Columbia federal

58

USA PATRIOT Act§ 412(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2004)); see john Lancaster, Hill
Puts Brakes on Expanding Police Powers, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001, at A6 (noting that in the "days
after Sept. 11 . . . [opinion] [p]olls showed that Americans overwhelmingly favor[ed] stronger
police powers, even at the expense of personal freedom."); see also Bryant & Tobias, supra note
15, at 390.
59
USA PATRIOT Act§ 412(a) ("The Attorney General shall place an alien detained under
paragraph (1) in removal proceedings, or shall charge the alien with a criminal offense, not
later than 7 days after the commencement of such detention. If the requirement of the preceding sentence is not satisfied, the Attorney General shall release the alien."). Senator Patrick Leahy
(D-Vt.) emphasized: "if an alien is found not to be removable, he must be released from custody." 147 CONG. REC. Sl0,558 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
60
USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a); see also 147 CONG. REC. Sl0,558 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (observing that "the Attorney General's certification of an alien under [section 412] is subject to judicial review").
61
The USA PATRIOT Act also changed the administration's venue proposal. See supra note
54. Original habeas corpus petitions can be filed in any U.S. district court with jurisdiction,
thus satisfying administration concerns about inconsistent authority with the less onerous stricture that all appeals be heard by the D.C. Circuit and with Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit cases
as the "rule of decision." USA PATRIOT Act§ 412(a); see also Koh, supra note 53, at 34 (characterizing procedural safeguards in the USA PATRIOT Act as "minimal").
62
Bush Order, supra note 2, § 3.
63
Id. § 2. The Order only covers those whom the President deems "it is in the interest of the
United States ... be subject to this order." Id. Although this grants discretion to not apply the
order, such discretion is unbridled, so executive power to apply it against anyone deemed an
international terrorist or one who aids or abets such conduct remains unrestrained.
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64

courts.
Yet, the Bush Order eliminates all judicial scrutiny that
might be sought by or on behalf of "any individual subject to [the]
65
order," the plain meaning of which the DOD Order later confirmed
by strictly proscribing federal judicial review of any feature of a pro66
ceeding under the order. The DOD Order dispels doubt about judicial scrutiny's preclusion-even a federal court exercise of habeas
corpus jurisdiction-when it expressly states:
A Commission finding as to a charge and any sentence of a Commission becomes final when the ~resident or, if designated by the President,
the Secretary of Defense makes a final decision thereon .... Any sentence made final by action of the President or the Secretary of Defense
67
shall be carried out promptly.

The Bush and DOD Orders, thus, suggest that the administration intends to retain suspected terrorists much longer than the USA
PATRIOT Act authorizes. 68
64

See supra text accompanying note 54; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249, 252-54 (2002) (assessing the
constitutional and statutory authority for the Order); Molly McDonough, Tribunals vs. Trials,
A.B.A. ]., Jan. 2002, at 20 (outlining criticism of the Order "that tribunals can be held in secret[,] ... do not require a unanimous verdict[,) are not held before juries[, and) may limit
defendants' opportunities to challenge evidence brought against them"); supra note 61 (showing that Congress rejected the idea and treated fears about conflicting authority of administration with a less onerous habeas corpus venue provision).
•> Bush Order, supra note 2, § 7 (b).
66
DOD ORDER, supra note 2, § 6(H); see also John Mintz, U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals;
New Rules Also Allow Leeway on Evidence, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al (concluding that
"[t]he Bush [A]dministration has settled on a complex set of military tribunal regulations more
advantageous to al Qaeda and Taliban defendants than the guidelines President Bush originally
issued"); Deborah L. Rhode, Editorial, Terrcrrists and Their Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at
A27 (discussing the DOJ's "unilateral assertion of ... authority to monitor lawyer-client communications" in certain terrorist-related cases). For analysis of the Order's specific provisos, see
DOD ORDER, supra note 2, § 6(H) (4), Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 393 (describing confirmation of the plain meaning of section 7(b) of the Bush Order by the DOD Order), and
Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Readies Plans for Terror Tribunals, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al (discussing the relaxed safeguards in military tribunals).
67
DOD ORDER, supra note 2, § 6(H) (2); see also Mintz, supra note 66 (stating that the original order barred appeals after conviction); Serrano, supra note 66 (noting that the order included no appeals to federal courts or the U.S. Supreme Court).
68
Given the Orders' prohibitions on federal court. review, I find deficient White House
Counsel's claim that the Bush Order preserves civilian court review: "anyone arrested, detained
or tried in the United States by a military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of
the commission's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court." Gonzales, supra note 15, at A27. This otherwise promising concession does not override the many indications that certification under Bush's Order precludes federal court review of detention, imprisonment, or other punishment, including death, that it authorizes. First, Gonzales limited
his promise of review in civilian courts to those "arrested, detained[,) or tried in the United
States" and to challenges to "lawfulness of a commission's jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis added).
Depending on the administration's view of 'jurisdiction," it may argue a federal habeas court
can only confirm the President had found in writing a detainee "subject to" his Order. Bush
Order, supra note 2, § 2. Second, Gonzales justified his informal view by citation to Quirin, not
the Order's text, which seems to proscribe judicial review. Gonzales, supra note 15, at A27. But
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Congress, and in particular senators, quickly and forcefully responded to the Bush Order. The Senate Judiciary Committee held
several hearings in which many government officials and constitu69
tional scholars with diverse political viewpoints testified.
Certain
members of the administration contended that President Bush's authority as "Commander in Chief' 70 of the armed forces included the
71
power to issue the order, but no witness analyzed whether the President could unilaterally abrogate federal court jurisdiction. Yet others
voiced serious concerns about the order's legitimacy, because it in72
73
vaded Congress's province or violated Bill of Rights guarantees.
The hearings and later actions, mainly the administration's lack of solicitude for legislative requests "to review and be consulted about the
74
draft [DOD] regulations[,] " led Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the
75
Judiciary Committee Chair, to act. He sponsored a February 2002
bill that "would provide the executive branch with the specific authorization it now lacks to use extraordinary tribunals to try members
of the al Qaeda terrorist network and those who cooperated with
76
them," because the President does not have power to create the en77
tities unilaterally. This proposal would restrict detainment and military trials much more and accord greater procedural protections
than did the Bush Order. For example, the bill exempts "individuals
arrested while present in the United States, since our civilian court
the Quirin Court reached the merits only after the DOJ elected "not to contest the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction." Lloyd Cutler, Column, Rule of Law: Lessons On Tribunals-From 1942,
WALL ST.J., Dec. 31, 2001, at A9. The administration might do so, relying on the Orders' terms
and, thus, have the courts reach the constitutional issues avoided in 1942. Even if Gonzales had
clearly found that the Bush Order protected judicial review through habeas corpus, this view
does not bind the administration in later litigation. I assume Counsel's integrity and good faith,
but his article does not commit President Bush to the close federal court review to which he
should acquiesce.
69
See 147 CONG. REC. Sl3,275-77 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (reviewing the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings related to the Bush Order).
70
U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 1.
71
See, e.g., DO] Oversight, supra note 11, at 314 (statement of John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney
General) ("[T]he President's authority to establish war crimes commissions arises out of his
power as commander-in-chief.").
72
See 147 CONG. REC. Sl3,277 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (summarizing testimony of a number of legal experts who found that the Bush Order invaded the powers of Congress).
73
See, e.g., DO] Oversight, supra note 11, at 93--94 (statement of Neal Katyal, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University) (stating how the Bush Order would violate protections in the Bill of
Rights).
74
148 CONG. REC. S742 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
75
See id. at S741.
,. Id.
77

Id. ("The Attorney General testified at our hearing on December 6 that the President
does not need the sanction of Congress to convene military commission[s], but I disagree. Military tribunals may be appropriate under certain circumstances, but only if they are backed lry specific
congressional authorization.") (emphasis added).
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system is well-equipped to handle such cases" B and subjects deten79
tions to the supervision of the D.C. Circuit.
President Bush, thus, relied on his power as President and Armed
Forces Commander in Chief to issue the order requiring that military
tribunals try certain persons who violate the laws of war and other
applicable laws and depriving these individuals of federal court access
and the judiciary of jurisdiction. However, Senate and House Republicans and Democrats questioned the directive's constitutionality,
conducted hearings and introduced proposed legislation, which
would curtail the authority President Bush claimed and expressly preserve federal court review. These indicia of disapproval, together
with legislative denial of administration requests for the broad power
the order claims, suggest that its effort to abolish jurisdiction contravenes legislative will.
iii. Youngstown
In reviewing this attempted elimination of judicial jurisdiction,
one must remember that the constitutional text, history, and High
Court opinions show that Congress has practically total authority to
establish the federal courts and provide their jurisdiction. President
Harry Truman's 1952 assertion of power to seize steel mills and the
Youngstown decision that he lacked the authority are the controlling
precedents. The Court assessed presidential issuance of an Executive
Order that seized the steel mills because he thought an impending
strike by the steelworkers' union would disrupt the Korean War effort.Bo Truman based the Order on powers the Constitution and statutes vested in him as President and Armed Forces Commander in
Chief. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, held that Truman
did not have seizure authority.Bi However, four Justices-Felix Frankfurter, RobertJackson, William 0. Douglas, and Harold Burton-who

78

Id. at S742; see also Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2002, S. 1941, 107th Cong. § 3.
On March 20, 2002, House members introduced an identical bill. See H.R. 4035, 107th Cong.
(2002). A year later, House members sponsored new bills. See Detention of Enemy Combatants
Act, H.R. 1029, 108th Cong. (2003); Military Tribunals Act of2003, H.R. 1290, 108th Cong.
79
SeeS. 1941, § 5(d); supra note 73 and accompanying text; infra notes 81, 84 and accompanying text. See generally CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT
( 1999); JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE
COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT (2001).
80
See Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952). See generally MARCUS, supra
note 36 (discussing the impact of the Youn~town decision on the exercise of presidential power
and the doctrine of separation of powers).
81
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 189-92 (2001) (discussing factors that played a role in the
Supreme Court's decision).
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82

joined Black -authored separate opinions. 83 Black stated that
power, if any existed, for adopting the order must be in a federal law
84
or the Constitution. He found neither statutes explicitly authorizing
the President to seize private property nor Acts from which this pre85
rogative could fairly be implied. Black surveyed whether the Constitution granted inherent power to issue the Order and canvassed potential sources from which the authority might derive. 86 He initially
proclaimed that characterizing seizure as an exercise of Truman's
military power as Armed Forces Commander in Chief would not suffice and described the initiative as a ·~ob for the Nation's lawmakers,
87
not for its military authorities." Black then ascertained that the several constitutional provisos which endow the President with executive
power furnished little support, principally because the document's
structure and language assign Congress lawmaking authority, which is
not subject to "presidential or military supervision or control."88
The Justices who joined Black mi~ht have concurred for reasons
similar to those Frankfurter espoused. The only concurrence which
deserves textual analysis is Justice Jackson's opinion, as its tripartite
scheme for resolving separation of powers issues is now an icon.90
Jackson opened his framework for evaluating federal governmental
authority by describing it as a rather oversimplified classification of
practical situations in which the President could doubt, or others
might challenge, the official's authority and crudely distinguish the

82

See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 634 Qackson, J., concurring); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring).
83
Justice Tom Clark concurred in the judgment but not in the opinion. See id. at 660
(Clark,]., concurring in part).
84
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585.
85
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. No law in express tenns allowed the chief executive to use
seizure as a tool for addressing labor disputes, while Congress had clearly rejected this approach. Id. at 585-86.
86
The government did not argue that the grant was express. See id. at 587.
87
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. He found theater of war an expanding concept, but could
not hold the President's Executive Order constitutional. Id.
88
Id. at 588; see also U.S. CONST. art. I,§§ 1, 8, cl. 18; art. II,§ 3.
89
Black's separation of powers analysis led Frankfurter to join the majority opinion, but he
found the principle more complex and flexible than it seemed and stated that varying views
might have suggested different emphasis and nuance which one decision could not capture,
thus requiring individual articulation to reach a common result. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
90
See id. at 634 Qackson, J., concurring); see also Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the judicial
Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 202-04 (Peter Brooks &
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (claiming the concurrence as the most persuasive opinion in the
Court's history); Katya! & Tribe, supra note 42, at 1274 (characterizing Jackson's analytical construct as "three now-<:anonical categories that guide modem analysis of separation of powers").
See generally Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 406-18 (analyzing the concurrences). The lower
courts that resolved Padilla also relied heavily on Youngstown. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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91

legal effects created by this relativity factor.
The three categories
designate contexts in which executive power is largest, least substantial, and somewhere between those polar extremes. The jurist maintained that the President exercises the most authority when proceeding with Congress's express or implied approval because the power
92
includes all that the officer has and all that the lawmakers delegate.
He described the second category as an intermediate one where the
Chief Executive proceeds absent an explicit legislative grant or denial
and can rely on the President's own authority alone, although there is
a "zone of twilight" where the Chief Executive and Congress might
93
have concurrent power or authority's distribution remains unclear.
In these situations, thus, legislative "inertia, indifference or quiescence," as practical matters, could occasionally allow, and perhaps
encourage, independent presidential efforts, while actual tests of
power may reflect the "imperatives of events and contemporary im94
ponderables, [not] abstract theories of law." The third grouping includes executive initiatives that conflict with express or implied legislative will. Presidential authority is at its nadir, because the Chief
Executive can invoke only the official's explicit powers in the Consti95
tution minus any applicable congressional authority.
Jackson
admonished that here judges must closely assess executive assertions
and honor exclusive power solely if courts disable legislators from act96
ing on particular matters. When Jackson applied his three-pronged
framework to the seizure, he quickly excluded the first category, as
the government "conceded that no congressional authorization exists
for this seizure,"97 and the second, because lawmakers had not found
98
seizure an open issue. Thus, the initiative must be sustained under
the third classification's severe restraints, and the Justices could affirm the endeavor only by finding that seizure was within executive
99
power and beyond Congress's purview. Jackson pledged to read
flexibly the President's enumerated constitutional authority, and he

91
92

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 Oackson,J., concurring).
See id. at 635-37. The president personifies the federal sovereignty, so invalidation of an

action undertaken would mean that the "Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks
power." Id at 636-37.
93
Id. at 637 (citation omitted).
94
Id. (citation omitted).
95
See id.
96
Id. at 637-38. A claim so conclusive and preclusive requires scrutiny, as the constitutional
system's equilibrium is at stake. Id. at 638; see also Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948)
Oackson,J., concurring) (scrutinizing "war power").
97
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638. This would also remove the support of many declarations
and precedents that were proffered in "relation, and must be confined, to this category." Id.
(citation omitted).
98
See id. at 639.
99
See id. at 640.
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surveyed the power claimed by reviewing the Executive Article's three
100
clauses.
However, the jurist concluded that the steel seizure effort
originated in the President's will and was an "exercise of authority
101
without law."
Application of Youngstown's evaluative framework to the Bush Order suggests that the Order's authorization for indefinite detention
and elimination of federal court review are unconstitutional. 102 The
provisions fail the Youngstown test mainly because the~ violate recent
expressions of legislative will regarding both matters. 10 The Constitution's text and history also show that Congress, not the Executive, is
the political branch with the power to prescribe federal court jurisdiction.104 Accordingly, the Bush Order's indefinite detention and jurisdiction-stripping features invade even more than the steel seizure
action legislative prerogatives.
b. A Word About Quirin
The foregoing analysis finds that Youngstown would govern constitutional challenges to major provisos of the Bush Order. That assessment implies that Qµirin is not controlling and, indeed, has limited relevance, even though the administration depended
substantially on the case. This reliance is misplaced for reasons in
addition to the determination of unconstitutionality that Articles I
and III and Youngstown compel. The administration justifies military
tribunals in part because they are premised on the Roosevelt analogue, whose legitimacy the Quirin Court validated.
These arguments, however, lack force. Earlier commissions,
which afforded such drastically cabined procedural safeguards as the
Bush Order, were used only when Congress had expressly approved
them or declared war. 105 Lawmakers have instituted neither action,

100

Id. He rejected a "niggardly construction" as some clauses could become nearly unworkable and immutable by indulging no "latitude of interpretation for changing times." Id.
101
Id. at 655. For Youngstown's later invocation, especially in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981), see Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 420-23.
102
The Black opinion's laconic nature and the numerous and diverse concurrences frustrate
precise characterization of the holding. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW§ 4-7, at 671-73 (3d ed. 2000); see also Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 425-26 (articulating Youngstown's analytical framework).
103
See supra Part II.A.La.ii. Indeed, the congressional developments since September 11,
2001, are even more powerful than those in Youngstown because they are clearer and quite recent. For additional application of the analytical framework in Youngstown, see Bryant & Tobias,
supra note 15, at 425-31.
104
See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
105
See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1420; see also Koh, supra note 3, at 340 ("In Quirin, Congress
had formally declared war, which it has not done here, and had specifically authorized the use
of military commissions in its Articles of War." (citation omitted)).
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106
thus restricting Quirin's application.
Moreover, the Roosevelt proclamation was narrowly confined to "sabotage, espionage[,] or other
hostile or warlike acts." 107 In striking contrast, the Bush Order
broadly prescribes the offenses for which tribunals may try defendants to encompass violations of the "laws of war and other applicable
laws," 108 thereby extending the entities' scope beyond what Quirin approved.109 In 1996, Congress also passed the War Crimes Act, which
contemplates that persons who commit statutorily-defined war crimes
will receive civilian trials. 110

2. Detentions
a. Quirin
The Executive has asserted that Qµirin justifies indefinite detentions as well as broad judicial deference to administration decisionmaking regarding the detentions and military tribunals, while federal
judges have upheld detentions and acquiesced. However, the Quirin
opinion cannot support these notions. Many phenomena, including
the extraordinary wartime context, should limit the case's reach.
Furthermore, Quirin's author, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, intentionally wrote a restricted opinion, which some observers claim
must be read narrowly.
L

The Quirin Facts

Quirin's facts warrant much analysis, as they are so peculiar and
deserve a confined reading. 111 After the United States declared war,
106

In 1941, Congress had declared war and had approved tribunals in its Articles of War. See
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30 (1942); see also 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994). But see Goldsmith & Bradley, supra
note 64, at 250 ("Although the [Bush Order] was not preceded by a congressional declaration
of war, such a declaration is not constitutionally required in order for the President to exercise
his constitutional or statutory war powers, including his power to establish military commissions. ").
107
See Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942); see also Quirin, 317 U.S. 22-23
(quoting same regulation).
108
Bush Order, supra note 2, §I (e).
109
Congress has not declared war or authorized the use of tribunals for violations exceeding
the laws of war. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1421; see also infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text (suggesting Quirin may also be limited because federal habeas corpus, international,
and human rights laws were underdeveloped in 1942).
110
18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996); see Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1420-21. I combine below analysis
of misplaced reliance on Quirin both for detentions and in litigation over terrorism issues. In
the major terrorism cases reviewed above, the DOJ relied heavily on Quirin; however, the cases
attacking detentions and the judges deciding them also cited Quirin. Some ideas in this paragraPih show why Quirin cannot support broad notions, namely indefinite detention.
1 1
For the facts of the case, see Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20-22. See generally FISHER, supra note 6;
EUGENE RACHLIS, THEY CAME TO KILL: THE STORY OF EIGHT NAZI SABOTEURS IN AMERICA
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Adolf Hitler mandated prompt action against America on its soil.
Germany developed a plan with military and propaganda constituents
by requiring the destruction of American bridges, factories, railroad
stations, and department stores. 113 In spring 1942, experts instructed
the saboteurs on detonators, explosives, and related measures at a
114
training camp near Berlin.
Two teams of four saboteurs each then
boarded a submarine that deposited one group, with explosives, at a
Long Island beach under cover of darkness on June 13, 1942 and the
115
other team in northern Florida onJune 17.
Both teams' members
landed, dressed wholly or partly in German Marine Infantry uni116
forms, but then journeyed to major cities in civilian clothes.
Two
saboteurs concluded that they would be caught yet might be saved by
betraying the others, so one of them fully confessed to the Federal
Bureau oflnvestigation ("FBI") .117 On June 27, all the saboteurs were
in custody, and the FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, announced their
119
capture.
On June 30, Roosevelt informed the Attorney General, Francis
Biddle, that the saboteurs "are just as guilty as it is possible to be,"
and "offenses such as these are probably more serious than any offense in criminal law"; thus, the "death penalty is called for by usage
and by the extreme gravity of the war aim and the [nation's] very ex119
istence"; and they should "be tried by court martial."
Biddle, after
consulting the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and the Army Judge

(1961); Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the
Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 62-63 ( 1980); David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J.
SUP. Cf. HIST. 61 (1996).
112
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; see also Danelski, supra note 111, at 61. See generally FISHER, supra
note 6, at 4; Cyrus Bernstein, The Saboteur Trial: A Case History, 11 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 131-32
(1943) (discussing the orders given to the saboteurs).
113
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Robert E. Cushman, Ex parte Quirin et al.- The Nazi Saboteur Case,
28 CORNELL L.Q. 54, 55 (1942); Danelski, supra note 111, at 61, 63.
114
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Danelski, supra note 111, at 63. See generally FISHER, supra note 6,
at 1-23 (detailing the saboteurs' arrival and activities in America).
115
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Cushman, supra note 113, at 54; Danelski, supra note 111, at 6364.
116
See sources cited supra note 115. See generally FISHER, supra note 6, at 26--28, 35.
117
See Belknap, supra note 111, at 62; Bernstein, supra note 112, at 136-37; Danelski, supra
note 111, at 64-65.
118
See sources cited supra note 107; see also Belknap, supra note 111, at 62-63 (stating that
Americans reacted as if there had been a major victory in the war when Hoover announced
their capture); Danelski, supra note 111, at 64-65 (explaining that the FBI's issuance of misleading press releases, which suggested that its diligence led to the arrests, began the "government
control on information about the Saboteurs' [c]ase and the government's successful use of the
case for propaganda purposes.").
119
Danelski, supra note 111, at 65 (quoting Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Francis Biddle, Attorney General (June 30, 1942), 1940-44 PSF FDR Papers, FDR Library). See generally Jonathan Turley, Quirin Revisited, NAT'L. LJ., Oct. 28, 2002, at Al 7 (suggesting the Quirin
case raised questions about the Court's susceptibility to bias and threats in wartime).
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Advocate General, Myron Cramer, urged that a military commission
120
be convened to try the saboteurs.
Roosevelt issued a July 2 Executive Order creating a military tribunal, appointing the judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, and prescribing procedures as well as
review of the trial record and any commission judgment or sentence.121 The Order departed from Articles of War strictures by: authorizing admission of evidence with probative value for a reasonable
person; conviction and a death penalty sentence's imposition on a
two-thirds, not a unanimous, vote; and direct transmittal of the record, judgment, and sentence to the Chief Executive for review. 122
The same day, the President issued a Proclamation, ostensibly closing
the federal courts to "persons who are subjects, citizens[,] or residents of any nation at war with the United States ... and are charged
with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage,
123
espionage ... or violations of the laws of war."
On July 3, Cramer
filed charges with the military commission stating that the eight saboteurs had violated the laws of war; Article 81 of the Articles of War,
which involved relieving the enemy; Article 82, which implicated spy124
ing; as well as conspiracy to commit these offenses.
Five days later,
the tribunal commenced the secret trial in a DOJ assembly room, and
125
it continued for three weeks.
The saboteurs' counsel, Army Colonels Cassius Dowell and Kenneth Royall, believed the Order and
Proclamation lacked validity and informed Roosevelt that they would
seek habeas review, prompting his enraged response: "I won't hand
them over to any United States marshal armed with a writ of habeas
120

See Danelski, supra note 111, at 66 (citing Memorandum from Francis Biddle, Attorney
General, to President Roosevelt Qune 30, 1942), OF 5036, FDR MSS). Biddle thought this approach would be rather expeditious, make it easier to prove the charge of violating the law of
war, and permit the death penalty's imposition. See FISHER, supra note 6, at 48--50; Belknap,
supra note 111, at 63-64; Danelski, supra note Ill, at 66. He also harbored secrecy concerns,
that there not be revelations about the ease with which the saboteurs had landed on American
soil and the inept FBI behavior at the Second World War's outset. See Belknap, supra note I 11;
Danelski, supra note 111, at 66; Katya! & Tribe, supra note 42, at 1280-81.
121
Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101, 5103 Quly 7, 1942); see also Danelski, supra note
111, at 67 (detailing FDR's decision to issue the order).
122

Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. at 5103; see also Danelski, supra note 111, at 67. Biddle
told Roosevelt the deviations "should save a considerable amount of time" but would also facilitate the saboteurs' conviction and imposition of the death penalty. Danelski, supra note 111, at
66 (quoting Memorandum from Francis Biddle, Attorney General, to President Roosevelt Qune
30, 1942), OF 5036, FDR MSS).
123

Proclamation No. 2561, 7Fed. Reg. at5101Quly2, 1942); seealsoExparteQuirin, 317 U.S.
I, 22-23 (1942). See generally FISHER, supra note 6, at 50-53 (discussing Roosevelt's Proclamation).
124
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23; see also Bernstein, supra note 112, at 142-43; Danelski, supra note
111, at 67 (listing the charges).
125
The government stated that the Commission was conducting the trial in secret for security
reasons. See Belknap, supra note 111, at 66; Espionage: 7 Generals v. 8 Saboteurs, TIME, July 20,
1942, at 15.
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126
corpus."
In late July, Biddle and Royall convinced the Sugreme
1
Court to hear the case, and Stone convened a special session. ' The
128
Court heard oral arguments for over nine hours on July 29 and 30.
Before the initial argument, all of the Justices except Douglas, who
was en route, met in conference for a preliminary discussion, and Justice Owen Roberts stated that Biddle thought Roosevelt would exe129
cute the saboteurs regardless of their appeals' disposition.
The
Court quickly decided the case, assembling less than a day after arguments to issue a terse per curiam order. 130 Stone recounted the
litigation's history and said that the Justices would announce their
disposition and later file a full opinion that explained the reasoning.131 The order found Roosevelt had constitutional power to create
a military tribunal and try the saboteurs, who had "not shown cause
for being discharged by writ of habeas corpus." 132
The commission, which had recessed while the saboteurs ap133
pealed, promptly resumed.
On August 1, it heard closing arguments, and two days later, found all defendants guilty and recommended death sentences. The tribunal submitted the record directly
134
to Roosevelt, who accepted most suggestions.
On August 8, the
135
United States electrocuted six of the petitioners.
The President
136
then sealed the case record for World War II's remainder.
Stone agonized over the draft's full opinion for more than six
137
weeks.
On September 25, he circulated it with a memorandum,

126

FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORllY 331 (1962); Danelski, supra note 111, at 68.
FISHER, supra note 6, at 67-68; RACHLIS, supra note 111, at 246. The lower court procedural history appears in Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19-20.
128
Belknap, supra note 111, at 75. For summaries of the arguments proffered by the United
States and by the petitioners, see id. at 70-75; Danelski, supra note 111, at 68-69. See generally
FISHER, supra note 6, at 89-108 (discussing the arguments presented by both sides in their respective briefs as well as those proffered at oral argument).
129
Danelski, supra note 111, at 69.
130
Belknap, supra note 111, at 76.
"' Danelski, supra note 111, at 68-72; RACHLIS, supra note 111, at 272.
132
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19; RACHLIS, supra note 111, at 272. The Court, thus, dismissed the
petitioners' applications for habeas writs and affirmed the district court. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1819.
"' Danelski, supra note 111, at 71.
134
The record was 3000 pages. President Roosevelt did commute death sentences recommended for the two saboteurs who defected. Belknap, supra note 111, at 77; Danelski, supra
note 111, at 72.
135
Belknap, supra note 111, at 77. Roosevelt reportedly hoped that the military commission
would propose death by hanging. WILLIAM D. HAsSEIT, OFF THE RECORD WITH FDR, 19421945, at 97 (1958); Danelski, supra note 111, at 72.
136
See Bernstein, supra note 112, at 188-89 (detailing a White House announcement summarizin,g the results of the case); Danelski, supra note 111, at 71-72.
" See Danelski, supra note 111, at 72 ("He would devote more than six weeks to the task,
which he described as a 'mortification of the flesh.'"). Chief Justice Stone posited an intuitive
rationale for a decision, but his law clerks found "little authority" for this, and Stone could only
127
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intimating that certain issues the defense counsel had raised in July
had not been before the Court, yet urging that they be decided
138
against the saboteurs.
For several weeks, Stone negotiated changes
139
which would satisfy a few Justices' concerns. Stone then focused on
the Articles of War provisos over which the Court was evenly divided
and for which he had written two drafts. 140 Justice Frankfurter unsuccessfully pursued support for the second. 141 However, on October 16,
Justice Jackson circulated a memorandum that resembled a concurrence, which troubled other members, who had earlier agreed that
142
unanimity was critical.
He believed the Court exceeded its powers
"in reviewing the legality of the President's Order [and that] experience shows the judicial system is unfitted to deal with matters in
143
which we must present a united front to a foreign foe." That action
144
jeopardized unanimity and led Frankfurter to pen a "Soliloquy."
This imaginary exchange criticized the dead saboteurs for appealing
and for igniting a divisive three-branch fight. 145 Once Jackson read
cite analogous cases at numerous crucial points. Id.; see also id. (citing Letter from Chief Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone to Bennett Boskey (Aug. 9, 1942)).
138
He expressed concern about the Court being "in the unenviable position of having stood
by and allowed six men to go to their death without making it plain to all concemedincluding the President-that it had left undecided a question on which counsel strongly relied
to secure petitioners' liberty." Id. (citing Memorandum from Chief Justice Stone to the Court
(SepL 25, 1942), Box 68, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
139
See id. at 75--76 (discussing Stone's changes to the opinion to satisfy Justices Roberts,
Black, and Douglas).
140
Id.
141
This draft stated that the Articles of War did not bind the Chief Executive. See id. at 76
(citing Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justices Owen Roberts, Stanley Reed,
and James Byrnes (Aug. 1942)); id. (citing Paige Box 12, Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law
School; Justice Stanley Reed to Justice Felix Frankfurter (received Sept. 13, 1942), Paige Box 12,
Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School).
142
Justices Stone, Frankfurter, and Black were troubled by the memorandum. See id. (citing
Memorandum fromJustice Robert H.Jackson (Oct. 23, 1942), Box 124, Robert H.Jackson Papers, Library of Congress).
140
See id. (quoting Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson (Oct. 23, 1942), Box 124,
Robert H.Jackson Papers, Library of Congress); Belknap, supra note 111, at 79.
144
The document has attained considerable notoriety. See Felix Frankfurter, F.F. 's Soliloquy
(Oct. 23, 1942), reprinted in 5 GREEN BAG 2D 438 (2002); see also G. Edward White, Felix Frankfurter's "Soliloquy" in Ex parte Quirin, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 423 (2002) (introducing the soliloquy by
summarizing the facts leading to its writing).
145
See Frankfurter, supra note 144, at 439 ("You've done enough mischief already without
leaving the seeds of a bitter conflict involving the President, the courts and Congress after your
bodies will be rotting in lime."); see also Danelski, supra note 111, at 77 (showing that Frankfurter implored the Justices with a patriotic plea against precipitating an abstract constitutional
debate while America was at war). Frankfurter quotes an imaginary soldier as saying:
Haven't you got any more sense than to get people by the ear on one of the favorite
American pastimes-abstract constitutional discussions .... Just relax and don't be too
engrossed in your own interest in verbalistic conflicts because the inroads on energy and
national unity that such conflict inevitably produce, is a pastime we had better postpone
until peacetime.
Frankfurter, supra note 144, at 440.
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146

the missive, he decided against a concurrence, while Justice Roberts
147
urged compromise.
Stone continued "patient negotiations" 148 and
announced the Court's decision on October 29, 1942. 149
11.

Analysis of the Quirin Opinion

The Court intentionally resolved the case on the narrowest
grounds, so stating expressly, and declined to address many factual
and legal questions. For example, Stone neither thoroughly scrutinized the claims against, and defenses proffered by, the saboteurs,
nor the processes which tested them. This review derived in essence
from party agreement that rigorous scrutiny exceeded the Court's
capacity, given the time restraints. Most relevant facts were actually
50
stipulated and undisputed,1 while Stone did not address petitioners'
151
"guilt or innocence."
The Justices also left undecided some legal
questions, such as whether Roosevelt alone might create the tribunal
or whether Congress could limit presidential authority to treat enemy
belligerents, mainly because it had "authorized trial of offenses
against the law of war before such commissions. "152
The Court first assessed the government contention that Roosevelt's proclamation prevented the saboteurs from seeking federal
court review because they were "enemy aliens" who had engaged in
153
the behavior recounted above.
Notwithstanding the document's
specific words, which purported to eliminate judicial scrutiny, the Jus154
tices reviewed the petitioners' habeas writs.
Stone admonished that
146

See Danelski, supra note 111, at 78 (citing Notes exchanged by Justices Felix Frankfurter
and Robert Jackson (Oct. 1942), Paige Box 12, Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School).
147
See id. (citingJustice Owen Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter (n.d.)).
148
See id. at 79 (citing ChiefJustice Harlan Fiske Stone to Roger Nelson (Nov. 30, 1942), Box
69, Stone Papers).
149
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Chief Justice Stone ultimately secured a resolution in
which his colleagues agreed to disagree about the rationale. See Danelski, supra note 111, at 7879 (detailing the compromises the justices' made); see also infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (discussing compromises).
150
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20 (presenting the facts as undisputed except where noted). I reproduce many of the facts above. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
151
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. For example, the Supreme Court did not resolve the question of
whether one of the saboteurs had actually lost his United States citizenship. See id. at 37-38
(noting that because "(c]itizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of belligerency," determination of that issue was irrelevant).
152
Id. at 29, 47 (declining to address petitioners' contention that if Congress authorized their
trials "it ha[d] by the Articles of War prescribed the procedure by which the trial [was] to be
conducted").
153
Id. at 24-25; see also supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
154
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25 ("[T]here is certainly nothing in the Proclamation to preclude access to the courts for determining its applicability to the particular case."); see In re Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (stating that Congress has "not withdrawn (jurisdiction], and the Executive" could not unless habeas corpus were suspended).
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federal courts could overturn petitioners' trial and detention-which
the President had ordered by exercising Commander-in-Chief authority in wartime--0nly if clearly convinced they violated the Constitution or statutes. 155 The Court canvassed Article I and II powers that
provide for the common defense and found that the President has
broad authority to wage war as declared by Congress and to effectuate
all statutes which prescribe war's conduct as well as to define and
punish "offenses against the law of nations." 156 Stone then asked
"whether any of the acts charged [were] an offense against the law of
war cognizable before a military tribunal, and if so[,] whether the
Constitution prohibits the trial," ascertaining "[b]y universal agreement and practice, the law of war" distinguishes lawful and unlawful
combatants: the former are "subject to capture and detention as
prisoners of war by opposing military forces." 157 Unlawful combatants, such as the enemy "who without uniform comes secretly
through [military] lines" to wage war by destroying life or property,
are "offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment
158
by military tribunals."
The Justices so classified the saboteurs, finding the initial allegation's first specification adequate to "charge all
the petitioners with the offense of unlawful belligerency, [the] trial of
which" was within the commission's jurisdiction. 159 The Court said
they were not "any the less belligerents" because some were United
States citizens or had not "actually committed or attempted to commit any act of depredation" or entered an area of active military operations.160
Stone next assessed the merits of petitioners' substantive claims
that they were entitled to "presentment or indictment of a grand
jury" by the Fifth Amendment and to a civil courtjury trial by Article
III and the Sixth Amendment. 161 "[L]ong-continued and consistent
interpretation" meant the provisos did not extend "the right to
155

Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
Id. at 25-29; see U.S. CONST. arts. 1-11. The Court's suITey of the Articles of War found
that Congress had expressly accorded military tribunals "jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses
against the law of war in appropriate cases." Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28; see also TRIBE, supra note
102, § 4-6, at 670 ("In time of war ... this executive authority swells ... (justified by] the President's position as Commander in Chief.").
157
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29-31.
158
Id. at 31 (citation omitted).
159
See id. at 36 ("The specification so plainly alleges violation of the law of war as to require
but brief discussion of petitioners' contentions.").
160
Id. at 37-38 (finding "[m]odem warfare is directed at the destruction of enemy war supplies ... as much as at the armed forces."). "The offense was complete when" each person, who
was an enemy belligerent, passed or went behind American "military and naval lines and defenses ... [wearing] civilian dress and with hostile purpose." Id. at 38; see also TRIBE, supra note
102, § 3-5, at 300 n.185 (stating that jurisdiction extended even to American citizens for sabotage).
161
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38-45.
156
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demand ajury to trials by military commission, or [require] that offenses against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be
162
tried only in the civil courts. "
The Court assumed that some of
163
those offenses are "constitutionally triable only by a jury," a view it
164
had articulated in Ex parte Milligan.
Petitioners argued that Milligan
held that the law of war "can never be applied to citizens in states
which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the
165
courts are open and their process unobstructed." Because Milligan
"was not an enemy belligerent," Stone distinguished this opinion, apparently restricting Milligan to its facts and finding the decision inap166
plicable to the present case.
The Court did not designate meticulously the tribunal jurisdiction's ultimate scope as the saboteurs, "upon the conceded facts, were
167
plainly within those boundaries."
The Justices, thus, held only that
the behavior at issue was an "offense against the law of war which the
168
Constitution authorize[d] to be tried by military commission." The
Court was "unanimous in its conclusion that the Articles in question
could not at any stage of the proceedings afford any basis for issuing
169
the writ[,] " but lacked a majority who agreed on the "appropriate
11
grounds for decision." ° Certain Justices thought "Congress did not
intend the Articles of War to govern a Presidential military commission convened for [resolving] questions relating to admitted enemy
invaders," 171 even as others believed specific Articles covered this tribunal, but neither precluded the measures Roosevelt prescribed nor
112
those used.
My analysis shows many factors warrant limiting Quirin. For example, the case evinces the speed with which the government

162

Id. at 40.
Id. at 29.
164
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); see REHNQUIST, supra note 81, at 75-77 (stating the result
would have been identical even if Congress provided for a court martial); Katya! & Tribe, supra
note 42, at 1287 (characterizing Milligan as holding congressional authorization necessary but
not sufficient for military tribunal).
165
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121; see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (quoting Milligan).
166
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46 (deciding it was sufficient that the pleaded facts plainly established petitioners were alleged to be enemy belligerents under stated laws). See generally
RICHARD H. FALLON JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYsTEM 408--15 (5th ed. 2003); Belknap, supra note 111, at 85 (arguing Stone concluded
Milligan was not "associated with the armed forces of the enemy"); Katya! & Tribe, supra note
42, at 1277-87 (discussing the Milligan and Quirin decisions).
167
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added).
1
6'! Id. at 46.
169
Id. at 47.
110 Id.
163

171

Id.
See id. at 47-48 (noting that some Justices did not limit available procedures to those applicable under the Articles of War).
172
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proceeded, the Court's ratification of the commission deliberations
and the difficulties of rationalizing the full opinion once the United
States had used a hastily-written, laconic per curiam order to execute
173
six petitioners. Stone described his justificatory effort as a "mortification of the flesh," 174 while the Court differed on the result's reasoning.175 Quirin manifests the wartime setting when, for instance, national security interests have eroded, and often trumped, civil
176
The opinion also reflects improper exogenous pressures,
liberties.
most critically from Roosevelt, to legitimize rapid trial, prompt con177
viction, and grave punishment, as well as internal ones, mainly from
178
Justice Frankfurter, who later admitted Qy,irin was "not a happy
179
precedent."
Twenty years after the case issued, Justice Douglas bemoaned the experience as showing "all of us that it is extremely undesirable to announce a decision on the merits without an opinion
accompanying it.
Because once [we] search for the
180
grounds, ... sometimes those grounds crumble."
Moreover, the
decision was exceptional, very narrow, and should be restricted to its
181
unusual facts. Many observers have suggested that Quirin be sharply

"' Id. at 18.
174
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 659 (1956); see also
Danelski, supra note 111, at 72.
m See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
176
See generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURilY CONSTITUTION (1990) (analyzing the tension between national security and civil liberties); TRIBE, supra note 102, § 4-6, at
670 (declaring that presidential authority broadens during times of war); Earl Warren, The Bill
of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 191-93 (1962) (discussing briefly that decisions
in wartime are often "abhorrent" in view ofnorrnaljudicial, peace-time decisions). Justice Jackson even said the Court had exceeded its authority. See Danelski, supra note 111 (citing Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson (Oct. 23, 1942), Box 124, Robert H. Jackson Papers,
Library of Congress).
177
See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 6, at 50-53 (describing Roosevelt's various responses to military tribunals); Katya! & Tribe, supra note 42, at 1291 (arguing that the pressures on the Court
warranted reconsideration); supra notes 119-34 (recounting President Roosevelt's opinion regarding swift punishment of the "saboteurs").
178
Most notable was Frankfurter. See supra note 144 (indicating his concern about the Quirin
case); see also sources cited supra note 144.
1
7. Danelski, supra note 111 at 80 (quoting Memorandum of Justice Felix Frankfurter Qune
4, 1953), Box 65, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School); see also id. (commenting on
criticisms of the Quirin decision); White, supra note 144, at 436 (examining Frankfurter's
qualms about Quirin).
180
Interviews by Walter F. Murphy with Justice William 0. Douglas, U.S. Supreme Court
Qune 9, 1962) (transcript on file with Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton Univ.)
(discussing the "patient negotiation" that accompanied the Quirin decision); see also Danelski,
sufri:a note 111, at 80.
181
See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1942) ("We hold only that those particular acts constitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military
commission."). Other opinions have articulated the precept that the Court should draft opinions narrowly. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (discussing the judicial practice of "dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way");

1144

JOURNAL OF CONSTIWTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 6:5

confined, and a few have analogized the opinion to Korematsu v.
182
United States, the discredited ruling which validated internment of
.
183
J apanese Am en cans.
b. Additional Reasons for Limiting Quirin
There are other major ways in which Quirin is limited, essentially
warranting the determination's consignment to an archaic Second
World War relic, which offers minimal support for the recentlyinstituted punishment regimes. It is important to understand that
the time period in which the Supreme Court resolved Quirin antedated the dramatic growth of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence,
criminal procedure safeguards, and international and human rights
law.
i.

Habeas Corpus

Careful evaluation of Quirin and its historical context undermines
the assertion by numerous Bush administration officials that the Justices only scrutinized whether the military tribunal's jurisdiction was
184
lawful.
The Court framed the issues vis-a-vis commission jurisdiction over the saboteurs and the alleged offenses, but the Justices
clearly exercised jurisdiction and proceeded to resolve on the merits
petitioners' substantive claims that tribunal procedures violated their
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and the Articles of War. Moreover, the litigants' broad factual stipulation obviated any need for ju185
dicial inquiry regarding those facts or their proof. However, even if
186
the Quirin Court merely treated jurisdiction in the narrowest sense,
the decision could not justify analogous confinement of federal

Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-61 (1981) (commenting on the necessity to determine the validity of presidential action on the narrowest possible grounds).
182
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming an order excluding people of Japanese ancestry from a
military area during World War II because of the threat to national security).
183
See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 42, at 1290-91 (comparing Quirin to Korematsu to demonstrate why the case should be discounted as precedent); Turley, supra note 119, at Al 7 (discussing how Quirin is the "sister case" to Korematsu); see also Warren, supra note 176, at 193-94 n.33
(comparing Quirin and Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (regarding a Russian army
colonel apprehended in New York who was granted a full civilian trial and the protections of
the Bill of Rights, in terms of military jurisdiction).
184
See supra notes 150-83 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's decision in Quirin
and explaining the various issues addressed by the Court).
185
See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (observing
that the precedential significance of Quirin was limited by the parties' factual stipulation).
186
I recognize that the Court did not scrutinize the substantive claims against and defenses of
the petitioners or the procedures used to test them, mainly because the parties agreed that such
review was beyond the Court's capacity given the case's temporal context. See supra notes 15051 and accompanying text (describing the Court's capacity, given the time restraints).
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judicial review, which scrutinizes detention or punishment under the
Bush Order. Assuming arguendo that Quirin mandated circumscribed review, this feature must be updated to reflect the substantial
evolution of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence in the six decades
following Quirin's issuance.
The law which governed the scope of federal habeas corpus scru187
tiny in 1942, the year Quirin issued, cabined review.
Federal courts,
in habeas proceedings then and since the nation's founding, essentially undertook a ·~urisdictional inquiry," so conviction by a court
188
with valid jurisdiction ended the dispute.
It was not until the 1950s
that the Justices abandoned this restricted habeas corpus jurisprudence and began its profound expansion, 189 which means today the
writ is generally available for remedying constitutional mistakes which
infect convictions. 190
11.

International Legal Developments

The second principal way that Quirin is limited reflects the strikingly underdeveloped condition of international law, as well as of

187

See FALLON ET AL., supra note 166, at 1364-68 (assessing debate over the writ's scope).
Leading, and often diverse, views on this history include WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE
CREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY (2001); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The
Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992); Lewis
Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court As Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31
(1965); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451
(1966); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus &litigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579
(1982); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993).
188
There are several lead cases for the "jurisdictional rule" in Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193,
203, 3 Pet. 119, 126 (1830). See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (remanding a denial of a habeas petition to determine if the right to counsel was waived); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923) (reversing a denial of a habeas petition); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371
(1879) (holdingjurisdiction over a writ because the petition was appellate in nature).
189
Typical is Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), which affirmed denial of petitions for habeas relief. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION§§ 10.4-10.5, at 682-86 (4th ed.
2003) (tracing the history of habeas corpus law); Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus:
Part III-Brown v. Allen: The Habeas Corpus Revolution That Wasn't, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1541 (2000)
(providing an historical analysis of habeas corpus jurisprudence). Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S.
101 ( 1942), which allowed for the use of writs in cases where conviction violated the accused's
constitutional rights and the writ is the only effective means of preserving rights, may have departed from Watkins, but case law and commentary at the time suggest otherwise. See Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947) (denying habeas corpus petition and adhering to jurisdictional approach); Alexander Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B. U. L. REV. 26,
40-46 ( 1945) (discussing how, although the Supreme Court expanded the scope of habeas petitions, it adhered to certain fundamental principles).
190
A classic example is Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), which held that failure to appeal a
conviction did not require a denial of a habeas petition. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 189, §
10.5.2, at 690.
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global human rights law, when the determination issued.
For instance, the World War II-era opinion predates the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the Geneva
Conventions, treaties to which the United States is a party, as well as
long-established doctrines of customary international law respecting
due process. These factors show that the detentions and military
commission rules ignore numerous procedural safeguards in the
ICCPR, may violate the Geneva Conventions, and could infringe
upon due process strictures in human rights law.
c. Guantanamo Bay Detention Cases
Judges might have improperly resolved some litigation which challenged the Guantanamo Bay detentions, or at most the cases warrant
192
narrow application. In Al Odah v. United States, the D.C. Circuit
193
broadly read Johnson v. Eisentrager, which should be confined to its
unusual facts that implicated a declared war and military tribunals
Congress specifically authorized for prosecutions in a war zone, while
the mid-twentieth century time frame preceded the vast growth of in194
ternational and humanitarian law canvassed above.
However, the
Ninth Circuit's determinations that Eisentrager did not preclude its
exercise of jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition or mandate
sovereignty, rather than territorial jurisdiction, as well as its findings
that the Guantanamo lease, the treaty, and pragmatic realities mean
95
the base is sovereign territory for habeas purposes,1 apparently comport better with modem understandings of habeas corpus, interna196
tional, and human rights law.

191

See Cole, supra note l; Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1421-32 (detailing international laws
regarding procedural protections that secret detentions and proposed procedures for military
commissions ignore); Koh, supra note 3, at 338-39 (arguing that the military order undermines
the concept of separation of powers).
192
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.) (rejecting habeas petitions for lack of citizenship).
193
339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950) (holding that a habeas petition was properly dismissed because
"the Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an immunity from military trials and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war
with the United States").
194
See supra notes 38, 191 and accompanying text (discussing the Eisentrager case and the
state of international and humanitarian law). Because Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d
1153 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003) (mem.), did not reach detainment's
merits, it warrants no additional treatment here. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
195
Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003); Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d 1153.
196
See supra notes 39, 187-91 and accompanying text (detailing the jurisprudence of habeas
corpus, international and human rights law). The district judge thus far has resolved the vexing
Moussaoui case rather well. See United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003),
affd in part and vacated in part, No. 03-4 792, 2004 WL 868261 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2004); supra note
40 and accompanying text.

May 2004]

PUNISHMENT AND THE. WAR ON TERRORISM

1147

d. Summary

Indefinite detentions and military tribunals undermine the rule of
law at home by flouting basic constitutional protections and, globally,
by eroding international law tenets. For example, the commission
proceedings will limit defendants' rights in terms of what the Constitution normally guarantees for civilian trials while affording fewer
safeguards than courts martial. Illustrative are the lack of provision
for jury trials and the privilege against self-incrimination, lenient
rules governing evidentiary burdens, proof and verdicts, and the potential to close trials. The detentions concomitantly have violated,
and tribunals will undercut, major treaties to which the United States
197
is a signatory and essential aspects of customary international law,
such as due process requirements. Moreover, indefinitely detaining
individuals and trying suspects in commissions resemble behavior for
which America has castigated others and, thus, damage global relations by making the United States appear hypocritical.
B. Additional Reasons lVhy Reliance Is Misplaced

Reliance on indefinite detentions and tribunals is misplaced for
numerous reasons which complement and augment the legal ones
surveyed earlier. Dependence on practical and policy contentions to
suspend the rules, which typically govern adjudication of criminal responsibility, is unwise and may well be counterproductive. Advocates
of detentions and tribunals, who find law to be an inconvenience and
198
even dangerous, champion pragmatic ideas.
For instance, proponents assert that federal court trials impose too great temporal and
monetary expense, as well as risk on judges and jurors, that terrorists
deserve no protections, that the evidence available fails to meet strict
requirements and must be kept secret for national security purposes,
and that detentions and military tribunals accord the government
necessary control.
However, compliance with the letter of United States and international law and relianc~ on domestic and global legal process-in the
form of entities, such as federal courts and international tribunals,
and procedures, namely, due process and other constitutional safeguards-will advance near- and long-term American strategic interests at home, but especially in the new sociopolitical context

197

See, e.g., Int'! Convention on Civil and Political Rights, adopted, United Nations General
Assembly Res. 2200A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, in force Mar. 23, 1976.
198
I rely here and in the remainder of this paragraph on sources cited supra notes 2-20 and
accompanying text, which examine the circumstances surrounding the Quirin case in terms of
military commissions and detentions.
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199

produced by world terrorism.
Dependence on international legal
process will: help galvanize the world coalition the United States
needs to resist terrorism effectively; promote terrorists' apprehension, arrest, and prosecution; foster protection of Americans overseas;
establish the crime's international nature and isolate al Qaeda; facilitate development of global norms for terrorism; and increase the
perceived legitimacy of United States governmental actions.
Use of detentions and tribunals is also unwarranted because it imposes both disadvantages that resemble those identified earlier and
additional detriments. Most significantly, the practices have not accounted for their harmful consequences. Detaining thousands of
Muslim and Arab men in the United States and 650 individuals absent process at Guantanamo Bay has seriously infringed civil rights,
and trials before commissions promise to have similar effects. The
measures' impacts have been, and will be, visited principally on
communities of color. Without trivializing this enormous human toll,
the detention of many individuals for protracted times has been financially onerous. Moreover, the President's unilateral reliance on
detentions and creation of tribunals grants excessive authority to a
single governmental branch. The mechanisms, thus, have societal
costs for America domestically, because they erode treasured values,
including freedom and separated powers, and overseas, because they
jeopardize relations with other countries.
C. Summary Uy Way of Cost-Benefit Analysis

Proffering a reliable cost-benefit evaluation is difficult. Certain
phenomena, such as individual liberty and national security, are so
abstract that they defy quantification, while others, which seem more
tangible, cannot be reduced to precise amounts. Were calibration of
detriments and advantages easier, problems would still remain. Some
include identifying cause and effect linkages between these costs and
benefits, as well as between detentions and tribunals, guaranteeing
the accuracy of the yardsticks used, and striking a balance that involves commensurables. For example, if the measure of success is

preventing attacks within the United States since September 11, the
devices have apparently been effective. However, when the yardstick
199

See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1435, 1445-66 (examining the United States' role in international law in light of the increased emphasis on terrorism); Koh, supra note 3 (indicating
skepticism about the international community's ability to overcome political obstacles and the
effectiveness of military commissions); Turley, supra note 1, at 743-48 (analyzing the bases for
the use of military tribunals in the war on terrorism); see also David Cole, The New McCarthyism:
Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003) (describing the
United States' response to the September 11th attacks in a historical context and the use of the
criminal system and its safeguards in dealing with terrorism).
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applied is stopping terrorism worldwide or in the Middle East, or fostering civil liberties, success appears less clear. Nonetheless, the major disadvantages and benefits can be estimated and compared.
The novel and controversial punishment regimes have offered a
few advantages. For instance, the systems may have partially realized
their chief functional justifications; namely, protecting national and
global security, deterring terrorist activities, and making progress in
the war on terrorism. The measures could have helped preclude
strikes on American territory since September 11 and might have
stopped or reduced terrorism elsewhere, particularly in Afghanistan
and Iraq, although these notions are contested.
Even if the schemes have afforded certain benefits, including the
prevention of terrorist attacks within the United States, the regimes
have entailed substantial detriments, many of which I considered
above. The systems have not attended to their deleterious impacts.
Holding thousands with little process has violated the individuals'
rights, and these detentions have required gigantic fiscal expenditures. Prosecutions before military commissions will similarly affect
defendants' civil liberties, while unilateral executive institution of the
detentions and tribunals has accorded one branch too much power.
The mechanisms concomitantly disadvantage the United States at
home, by undermining cherished ideals, and abroad, by threatening
relationships with many states. Numerous assessed propositions,
therefore, show that the regimes' costs outweigh their benefits, while
the schemes have minuscule future viability and could warrant elimination or at least sharp curtailment.
In sum, basic aspects of the war on terrorism, namely detentions
and military tribunals, comprise unique and disputed punishment
systems. The regimes' adverse impacts, especially vis-a-vis civil liberties, outstrip the techniques' benefits, particularly those that involve
security. A number of Bush administration officials and judges correspondingly misplaced reliance on domestic precedent, such as Quirin,
when they instituted or approved the measures. This Article's final
section, thus, offers recommendations to address the issues that the
schemes and concomitant terrorism litigation have presented and will
raise.
Ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTURE

Because the detriments imposed by the novel, controversial punishment regimes eclipse their advantages, President Bush and Congress should terminate, or substantially restrict, the use of indefinite
detentions and military commissions. If the administration and lawmakers find these suggestions unpalatable because, for example, they
deem national and global security interests more compelling than
civil liberties, executive and judicial branch officials should accord
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relevant case law the kind of nuanced treatment surveyed earlier and
particularized below.
A. Reconsidering the Punishment Systems

1. Bush Administration
a. Military Tribunals
Many ideas canvassed above demonstrate that the President must
seriously reconsider his unilateral assertion of executive power to detain thousands of individuals for lengthy periods and to create military tribunals. The administration might proceed in ways that would
basically rescind these devices, circumscribe the techniques, or more
narrowly tailor the approaches to various factual scenarios. A threshold issue that deserves exploration is whether the commissions trench
so much on fundamental American values of liberty and separated
powers that·the tribunals warrant abrogation. Information reviewed
earlier arguably suggests that commissions should be disbanded, although numerous observers, most pertinently in the executive and
legislative branches, may consider this solution radical and unrealistic.
It is impossible to offer guidance that definitively treats the broad
spectrum of circumstances that will arise, while properly balancing
the multifarious relevant phenomena. However, in general, the administration should deploy a finely-calibrated evaluation, which attempts to maximize national security, civil liberties, separation of
powers, and financial economies. One more specific illustration
would be a presumption that requires federal court trials for individuals suspected of terrorism except when these prosecutions would
clearly jeopardize national security and, thus, warrant the use of a
200
military tribunal.
Related ideas include the availability and ostensible efficacy of techniques, such as document redaction and in camera
hearings, which would minimize the worst aspects of the forum
choice. Other examples are the myriad, innovative approaches devised by the trial judges who had responsibility for the federal court
201
proceedings that implicated Hamdi, Moussaoui and Padilla.
200

The government might be required to convince an Article III judge that the government
needs to proceed in a military tribunal and to satisfy a test that is stricter than the "some evidence" standard applied in terrorism litigation to date. See supra text accompanying note 35;
infra note 233 and accompanying text (demonstrating the deferential standard in Padilla). I am
not impugning the integrity of this administration or future ones that may understandably have
greater concern for national security than civil liberties.
20
' See supra notes 31-36, 40, 196; infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text (recounting the
reasoning behind the Hamd~ Moussaoui, and Padilla decisions). I appreciate that the Fourth
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Insofar as the administration chooses to try defendants before
military commissions, which federal judges hold valid, it should reas202
sess the strictures the Bush and DOD Orders prescribed and reformulate them in ways that will enhance safeguards such as due process, as well as the rights to counsel and against self-incrimination,
which the Constitution affords and which are recognized by interna203
tional or human rights law.
Two valuable sources inform these
mandates' reexamination and possible recalibration. One is Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment guarantees that modem federal courts
articulate as well as proof burdens, evidentiary requirements, and
other protections which they now impose. A second source includes
bills introduced during 2002 and 2003 that specifically authorize mili204
tary tribunals. Limiting commission invocation and elaborating the
safeguards granted would help address United States and international concerns related to civil liberties and domestic ones about
separated powers.
b. Detentions
The Bush administration must also consider and implement
mechanisms which rectify or temper the harmful effects of detaining
numerous individuals for prolonged times. Executive Branch officials should use a carefully-tuned assessment which implicates the
risks to national security, civil liberties, separated powers, and fiscal
integrity in proceeding, as well as the availability and effectiveness of
205
measures that remedy or confine those dangers.
For instance, the
DO] might evaluate trying Hamdi and Padilla in federal courts
206
or, perhaps, before military tribunals,
although these ideas'

Circuit rejected the district judge's approach in Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the tortured Moussaoui litigation may undercut my ideas, but the case is extraordinary,
and the district judge seems fair and diligent. This overall approach is based on federal courts'
comparative advantage, especially vis-a-vis protecting civil liberties, over military tribunals, but it
recognizes that national security concerns may trump them, when necessary.
202
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (documenting the DOD Order).
203
See supra note 191 and accompanying text (examining international and human rights
law).
204
See supra note 78 and accompanying text (analyzing a proposal that would accord greater
protections than did the Bush Order). Insofar as the Bush and DOD Orders' prescriptions do
not bind military tribunal judges, they should implement this guidance.
205
I envision refined application of the analysis presented supra note 200 and accompanying
text, which requires a stricter evidentiary standard for individuals charged with terrorism. Of
course, insofar as the administration is using practices that violate the rule of law, it must cease
doing so. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (documenting the recent issues regarding detention after September 11).
206
. The Bush Order's terms, which apply to non-citizens, may not permit this, as Hamdi and
Padilla are United States citizens. See sources cited supra note 2 (describing the DOD Order);
see also supra notes 19, 23-36 and accompanying text (explaining the Hamdi and Padilla cases).
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effectuation will await High Court resolution of their cases.
The
government should think about continuing with the trial of Moussaoui, as limited by the districtjudge, in federal court, or attempt to
208
prosecute the defendant before a military commission.
The administration must correspondingly institute efforts that will
facilitate treatment of many others whom it has detained. The government could use an analogous evaluation of risks and ameliorative
209
techniques. For example, the DOD and the DOJ should determine
the appropriateness of prosecuting numerous additional individuals
held at Guantanamo before military tribunals or even federal courts,
while enhancing detainees' safeguards, namely, greater access to
counsel. The DO] must also invoke a similar analysis to process more
expeditiously the thousands of Muslims and Arabs it has held by deciding whether they should be charged and tried and, if so, in what
forum.

2. Congress
Insofar as the Bush administration eschews these recommendations, Senate and House members should assess and implement
them. For instance, Congress might directly treat a number of questions that the unilaterally-instituted military tribunals pose. It could
enact legislation which would specifically authorize the commissions
and introduce new, or augment present, safeguards that implicate ar210
eas, such as burdens of proof, evidentiary mandates, and verdicts.
Lawmakers could also pass bills which would remedy or ameliorate
indefinite detentions' worst features. A related, promising approach
would be scrutinizing and eliminating or curtailing those USA
PATRIOT Act sections that govern detentions, which most erode civil
liberties when Congress reauthorizes the legislation that it hastily
adopted in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 211

7

2-0 The government recently accorded Hamdi and Padilla access to counsel.
See supra note
29 (discussing Hamdi's access to counsel); Michael Powell, Lawyer Visits 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at AlO (noting that Padilla was permitted to meet with counsel for
the first time since President Bush declared him an enemy combatant in 2002). Courts might
apply the safeguards developed by the district judge in Padilla. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; infra note 237 and accompanying text.
208
See supra notes 40, 196, 201 and accompanying text.
209
I envision refined application of the analyses presented supra notes 200, 205 and accompanying text.
210
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
211
See supra notes 53-54, 58-60 and accompanying text.
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3. Bush Administration and Congress
President Bush and Congress should individually and jointly consider alternatives that threaten civil liberties and separated powers
less, yet foster national security to the same degree as present procedures. One valuable example would be implementing some type of
international tribunal. 212 The United States might advocate the creation of a new institution or the expansion of present tribunal jurisdiction. Related options could be internationalized military commissions or a hybrid domestic/international court that would receive
United Nations help and be attached to peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan or Iraq where it would sit.
President Bush as well as Senate and House members may reject
these suggestions because, for instance, they think that the recommendations underemphasize national and global security considerations and overstate the need to protect civil liberties. If the chief executive and lawmakers do not adopt these ideas, judges should
evaluate and implement the concepts below in resolving litigation
which implicates terrorism.
B. Terrorism Litigation

1. Military Commissions
When the Bush administration actually prosecutes someone in the
military tribunal and that individual challenges its constitutionality,
the federal judge who entertains the case should resolve the matter
pursuant to numerous principles. Most important, the President
does not have authority to eliminate federal court jurisdiction, a
judgment compelled by the Constitution and Youngstown, ~ although
military commissions may be valid in particular contexts, namely, extraterritorial prosecutions that result from declared wars. Articles I
and III of the Constitution, in clear terms, state that Congress, not
the Executive, is the political branch with power to establish federal
214
courts and prescribe their jurisdiction.
Youngstown is concomitantly
the controlling precedent. The majority opinion concludes that the
President lacks authority to legislate in areas sRecifically delegated
5
to Congress, even in national emergencies,2 while the major
21

212

See Dickinson, supra note I; Koh, supra note 3.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
214
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, els. I, 2 ("The Congress shall have the power ... [t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("[T]he supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction ... with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.").
215
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-89.
213
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concurrence finds this power at its nadir when invoked absent an explicit grant and against clearly-stated legislative will. 216 Quirin correspondingly warrants quite narrow application. The Court did not resolve whether the chief executive acting alone could institute military
tribunals but premised its decision that the Roosevelt Commission
was valid mainly on Congress's war declaration and its explicit au217
thorization for tribunals in the Articles of War.
Other phenomena,
including the case's peculiar facts, its confined holding, and the wartime context, require Quinn's sharp limitation. In short, the Constitution and Youngstown dictate the conclusion that the Chief Executive
lacks power to nullify federal jurisdiction or to deny individuals accused of terrorism access to federal court.

2. Detentions and Related War on Terrorism Litigation
When federal judges address war on terrorism litigation, especially
implicating detentions, they should resolve these cases pursuant to
several essential tenets. Most important, courts should recognize that
the Bush administration and a few judges have invoked Quirin for
concepts, such as broad judicial deference to Executive Branch detentions, which the opinion does not support, and must cabin its application for numerous reasons. First, Quirin involved unique facts
218
that were basically uncontested.
Second, a number of phenomena
make the determination and its legal analysis vulnerable to criticism.219 Moreover, ChiefJustice Stone, in his majority opinion, intentionally and expressly limited the decision, its legal evaluation, and
220
the holding, while the Justices could not agree on a rationale.
Courts should also reject Quinn's expansive invocation for notions,
such as judicial acquiescence to presidential detentions. They must
recognize that the Court exercised jurisdiction, despite the Roosevelt
proclamation which purportedly barred it, while the Justices resolved
on the merits petitioners' substantive claims under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments and the Articles of War.
Quirin also deserves narrow application because the case's 1942 issuance substantially preceded burgeoning growth in federal habeas
corpus law. Federal judges must appreciate that the writ's expansion
by the Supreme Court has modified Quirin and should clearly reject
this antiquated feature of the opinion in treating the federal habeas
petitions the Bush Order will generate. Habeas corpus' 60-year

216

217
218
219
220

See supra notes 95-101 (discussing Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence).
ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
See id. at 20-22.
See supra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
See 317 U.S. at 47-48.
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development, which means the writ issues to prisoners confined under judgments that violate the Constitution, together with the Warren
Court's broadened interpretation of federal constitutional protections accorded criminal defendants, substantially alter federal habeas
jurisdiction's character and import. Illustrative of contemporary federal habeas' usage are allegations that state-appointed counsel fur221
nished ineffective assistance
and that police secured selfincriminating statements in violation of the requirements imposed by
222
Miranda v. Arizona.
These examples of the writ's modern application do not necessarily mean that a defendant whom a military tribunal lawfully tries will
have those or other constitutional protections. However, a federal
court that exercises jurisdiction over a habeas petition of someone
tried in a commission does possess the requisite authority for deciding on the merits constitutional challenges to tribunal operation and
must not be stymied by an outmoded allusion to Quirin. A party,
thus, might claim that admission of questionable evidence contravened the individual's Fifth Amendment right to "due process of
law," 223 or that the person's conviction lacked support in constitution224
ally adequate evidence or was premised on self-incriminating statements procured in a coercive manner. 225 The lax evidentiary criteria
that the DOD Order provides mean that litigants promise to raise
these issues. 226 However, defendants will pursue many additional
questions, while federal judges facing the issues in the context of a
habeas corpus petition otherwise within their statutory jurisdiction
should resolve them and must not be deterred by anachronistic references to Quirin.
Quirin, thus, prescribes meaningful federal court review to the
greatest extent allowed by relevant habeas corpus law while carefully
221

See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (finding ineffective assistance in a capital
case); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (determining respondent had received
grossly ineffective assistance).
222
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that prosecutors may not use statements made during custodial interrogation unless the defendant was first advised of his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to counsel); see also, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993)
(finding that inculpatory statements were made in violation of Miranda).
223
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The defendant might specifically claim that the evidence was inherently unreliable or that there was no meaningful opportunity for cross examination. Administration reliance on ex parte affidavits in Hamdi and Padilla may presage their use in
commissions. See Cole, supra note 1, at 977.
224
See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 229 (2001) (concluding that the defendant's conviction
failed to satisfy constitutional demands because the state "presented no evidence whatsoever" to
prove a basic element of the crime).
225
See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 708 ("Involuntariness [of self-incriminating statements] requires
coercive state action, such as trickery, psychological pressure, or mistreatment.").
226
See DOD ORDER, supra note 2, § 6(D) (1) (providing that evidence shall be admitted if it
"would have probative value to a reasonable person").
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warning against unjustified judicial intrusion in executive national security actions. Notwithstanding the Justices' appreciation of the wartime situation in which they ruled, the Court deemed resolving constitutional attacks on the presidential initiative compatible with its
judicial role.
Another reason why federal judges should treat Quirin narrowly is
that the opinion's 1942 timing preceded the great expansion in international and human rights law that occurred over the subsequent
227
six decades.
For example, judges should enforce, when applicable,
the obligations imposed by international treaties to which the United
States is a party. Courts could also invoke the due process strictures
which have evolved in international humanitarian law since 1942.
The war on terrorism litigation to date provides concrete examples of these ideas. In Hamdi, for instance, even the Fourth Circuit,
which has most solicitously read Quirin, appeared to denigrate the
government's argument that "courts may not second-guess the military's determination that an individual is an enemy combatant and
should be detained" because judges have a "constitutionally limited
228
role."
The appellate court initially restated the ideas by observing
that the United States "submits that we may not review at all its designation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant-that its de229
terminations on this score are the first and final word," and then rejected the government's motion to dismiss: "In dismissing, we
ourselves would be summarily embracing a sweeping propositionnamely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen
alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely
. h out c h arges or counse l on th e government ' s say-so. ,,230
wit
District Judge Robert Doumar, who first entertained the Hamdi
petition, narrowly viewed Quirin and eschewed the DOJ's reliance on
it. "[B]efore the government had time to respond to the [habeas]
petition, the district court appointed ... counsel for the detainee[,]
ordered the government to allow [him] unmonitored access to
231
Hamdi [,] " and "intimated that the government was possibly hiding
disadvantageous information from the court[,]" ordering it to pro232
vide considerable material assembled on Hamdi.
Judge Doumar

227

See supra note 191 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 32-33 (discussing the
Padilla district court's choice nonetheless to apply Quirin).
228
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting from the government's
brief).
229
Id.
230
Id. But see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (referencing the analysis used by the
Padilla district court).
"' Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003).
232
Id. at 462. These events occurred during an August 2002 hearing. To be sure, the Fourth
Circuit rejected these actions. Id. at 4 76.
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also closely reviewed President Bush's designation of Hamdi as an
enemy combatant because that label has such dire effects. The trial
"court asserted that it was 'challenging everything in the Mobbs' declaration' and that it intended to 'pick it apart' 'piece by
piece' ... [repeatedly] referr[ing] to information it felt was missing[,]" and issued an opinion which concluded the declaration fell
"'far short' of supporting Hamdi's detention." 233 The Fourth Circuit
believed these efforts to be overly rigorous; however, the district
judge's approach may have been preferable to the appellate scrutiny
that was so minimalist as to constitute "no meaningful judicial re.
,,234
VIew.
The Second Circuit treatment of presidential authority to designate United States citizens enemy combatants in Padilla, which relied
on Youngtown's analytical framework, while honoring, but not acquiescing in, executive prerogatives, concomitantly seemed better than
235
the Fourth Circuit's disposition of the analogous question in Hamdi.
The trial court that earlier decided Padilla correspondingly acknowledged that Quirin offered "no guidance regarding the standard to be
applied in making the threshold determination that a habeas corpus
petitioner is an unlawful combatant ... [b]ecause the facts in Quirin
were stipulated."236 The judge also ruled that Padilla should have access to counsel and imposed conditions, which the court apparently
237
thought were warranted for the protection of national security.
The Ninth Circuit's resolution of the issues presented by the
Guantanamo detentions 238 also seemed preferable to the D.C. Cir-

"' Id. at 462. A concomitant of Judge Doumar's approach would be imposing a review standard for these designations that is stricter than the quite lenient "some evidence" criterion that
the district judge articulated and used in Padilla. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
.,. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283; see supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing the
Fourth Circuit's analysis in Hamdi).
2
See supra notes 25-30, 37, 229-34 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' varying
"
treatment of defendants Hamdi and Padilla). Differential treatment may reflect critical factual
distinctions, as the Second Circuit and Fourth Circuit judges carefully observed. See Padilla ex
rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 711 (2d Cir. 2003) (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit
that comparing the "battlefield capture" of Hamdi in Afghanistan "to the domestic arrest" of
Padilla at O'Hare Airport in Chicago "is to compare apples and oranges" (quoting Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003))), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (mem.).
236
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 ( 1942) (stating that facts were stipulated by counsel).
237
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 610 ("Padilla may consult with counsel ... under conditions
that will minimize the likelihood that he can use his lawyers as unwilling intermediaries for the
transmission of information to others .... "); see supra note 36 and accompanying text. This
seems preferable to allowing detainees, such as Hamdi, to languish in military prisons pending
the conflict's end.
238
See Ghere bi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d
1153 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003) (mem.).
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239

cuit's treatment. For instance, the Ninth Circuit's rather narrow interpretation of Johnson v. Eisentrager24-0 and its flexible approach to habeas corpus jurisdiction more accurately reflected contemporary habeas' breadth, the dramatic growth of international and human
241
rights law, and pragmatic realities.
CONCLUSION

Specific dimensions of the war on terrorism impose new and controversial punishment systems. The Bush administration's reliance
on indefinite detentions and establishment of military tribunals have
undermined and will contravene the rule of law domestically and internationally. This dependence inflicts societal costs on the United
States both at home, by eroding venerable ideals-namely, separated
powers and civil liberties-and abroad, by straining relations with
numerous countries. If President Bush and Congress follow the recommendations above, they may threaten civil liberties less and be
able to protect national security as well.

239

See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct. 534
(2003) (mem.); see also supra notes 38-39, 194-96 and accompanying text.
240
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
241
See id.; supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.

